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Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries
Hans-Peter Weikard Rutz (2001) examined a sample of 122 IEAs and found that almost all (98 percent) contained some kind of participation clause.
As the abatement levels agreed in the Kyoto-Protocol are only binding until the end of 2012, negotiations about a post-Kyoto agreement will take place in December 2009 in Copenhagen. So far there is at least a consensus that in
Copenhagen a new multilateral agreement with country-specific commitments to further reduce greenhouse gas emissions is aimed at. Our paper contributes to the discussion about optimal international policy coordination in general and the issue of an MPR for a post-Kyoto agreement in particular.
IEAs are set up to control transnational spillovers. By their very nature IEAs have to be self-enforcing, meaning that countries decide voluntarily to join the agreement or not. Spillovers imply that, even though countries can reap some gains from cooperation, there are strong incentives to free-ride on an agreement and unilateral action is inefficient. In the case of greenhouse gases, a failure to establish a sufficiently large (and effective) coalition may even trigger catastrophic risks (Stern et al. 2007 , IPCC 2007 .
The design of the agreement is important to overcome the problem of free-riding at the ratification stage. Our paper focuses on MPRs as a very common and potentially successful tool to increase IEA participation. MPRs can be designed in different ways. They can be linked to the number of signatory countries 4 , to country characteristics (such as baseline emissions), contributions (such as an abatement target) or to combinations of these. In the Kyoto Protocol, for instance, 1 Given by the UNFCCC definition from 1992. 2 Article 25 of the Kyoto Protocol. 3 The recent literature on IEAs has been surveyed by Barrett (2003 Barrett ( , 2007 , Carraro and Marchiori (2003) and Finus (2003 and 2008) . 4 In this paper, the term signatories refers to sovereign states that have ratified the agreement. a twofold MPR rule has been implemented (55 countries representing 55 % of emissions).
We analyse the formation of an IEA as a coalition formation game with heterogeneous countries. We assume that each country is free to decide whether or not to join a unique IEA. Put more technically, we analyse a cartel formation game with open membership. We examine both, the choice of an MPR and its effects on equilibrium coalition formation among countries in this model. Our approach follows seminal work by Hoel (1992) , Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994) Our analysis shows that an MPR will always improve stability. More precisely, a stricter MPR always performs at least as well as a less strict MPR. This does not imply that an equilibrium MPR will require the membership of all countries. We find that in any subgame perfect equilibrium the MPR will be set at a level that allows at least one country to free ride.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe the game.
Section 3 provides the formal analysis of the game and determines key features of the equilibrium outcomes. In Section 4 we move to the discussion of our results.
This section puts our results into a broader perspective and provides further details on how our paper is linked to the literature on minimum participation rules.
Section 5 offers conclusions for international policy coordination.
A model of a IEA formation with minimum participation
We consider a 3-stage game with a set N of countries as players. As we wish to study coalition formation we assume 3 N . The three stages are (i) the minimum participation stage, (ii) the coalition formation stage, and (iii) the transboundary pollution game. We describe the game in more detail starting from the third stage going backwards. 
We assume that countries choose abatement levels simultaneously to maximise payoffs, i.e. singletons maximise their individual payoff while the coalition maximises the aggregate payoff of coalition members. We allow for heterogeneous countries, i.e. countries may differ with respect to their benefits and cost functions. We assume that the game satisfies the conditions of the formal transboundary pollution game described by Folmer and von Mouche (2000) and that the pollution is uniformly distributed as mentioned before. Hence we assume that abatement is a global public good. Such a transboundary pollution game has a unique Nash equilibrium (Folmer and von Mouche 2000, Proposition 2), referred to as partial-agreement Nash equilibrium by Chander and Tulkens (1995) . however, setting a minimum number of signatories does not seem to be adequate.
In our setting, where countries differ with respect to benefits and cost of abatement. Therefore a natural characteristic is countries" abatement level in the non-cooperative (all singletons) Nash equilibrium of the transboundary pollution game which reflects countries" respective marginal benefits and costs.
Let i q denote country i"s equilibrium abatement level in the non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium of the stage-3 game. We refer to the vector i iN q as benchmark abatement without an effective agreement. In the following we assume that an MPR refers to the sum of signatories" benchmark abatements. We denote the minimum required level of benchmark abatement by q . Hence, the MPR is satisfied and coalition S is effective if and only if (2) i iS.
In our game the MPR is set as follows. A randomly chosen country suggests q which the others accept or reject. As in Carraro et al. (2009) we require a unanimous decision, i.e. if a single country rejects, then no MPR applies and 0 q .
Analysis
We conduct the analysis going backward. RESULT 1 The partition function that results from the transboundary pollution game with a uniformly mixing pollutant described before is superadditive and exhibits positive spillovers.
In order to assess individual incentives to participate in a coalition, we need to determine how the coalition payoff is shared between members. Following
Weikard (2009) 
A particular sharing rule that satisfies the Claim Rights Condition is sharing proportional to outside option payoffs. In this case
iS . However, the remainder of the analysis holds for any sharing rule that satisfies the Claim Rights Condition. We refer to this class of sharing rules as "optimal sharing rules" for reasons that will become apparent below.
Stage 2. Now we can move to the coalition formation stage. A Nash equilibrium of the coalition formation game is a vector of ratification decisions 
(ii) A coalition S is externally stable if and only if for all jS it holds that
(iii) Coalition S is stable if and only if it is internally and externally stable.
To determine the equilibrium coalitions we proceed in two steps. First we discuss internal stability, then external stability. Note that our sharing rule implies that, if the coalition payoff exceeds the sum of outside option payoffs, then payoffs can always be shared such that the coalition is internally stable. Hence to check internal stability it is sufficient to check whether the Claim Rights Condition can be satisfied, i.e. to check condition (3). Next notice that if (3) is not satisfied for S, then S cannot be internally stable. Hence, sharing rules that satisfy the Claim Rights Condition will internally stabilise all coalitions that are possibly internally stable (Weikard 2009, Theorem 1) . It is in this sense that these sharing rules are optimal. Also note that whether (3) holds is determined by the partition function alone and therefore it is not necessary to specify the sharing rule.
A transboundary pollution game with optimal sharing has been examined in The following is straightforward.
RESULT 2 Every ineffective coalition is internally stable.
Proof. If coalition S is ineffective, then the smaller coalition i S will also be ineffective. Hence no country can gain by leaving an ineffective coalition.
To obtain the next result we introduce the notion of a pivotal country.
DEFINITION 4 (i) Country iS is pivotal for an effective coalition S if and only if coalition i S is ineffective.
The next result follows by construction.
RESULT 3 The outside option payoff of a pivotal member of S is its benchmark payoff.
To determine the impact of an MPR on coalition (internal) stability, we need to examine how an MPR affects coalition payoffs and outside option payoffs. In the remainder of the analysis we assume that the grand coalition is unstable under 0 q . Else an MPR has no force and the problem is not very interesting.
We know from RESULT 7 that the grand coalition will be internally stable and therefore stable under N. Also we know that the grand coalition is efficient. The next question then is whether any country can get a higher payoff than in the grand coalition. For this it is important to note that individual payoffs in the grand coalition depend on outside option payoffsnote that the Claim Rights Condition must be met. The outside option payoffs will, in turn, depend on the MPR. Hence, the country that proposes the MPR will determine which countries are pivotal. This will impact the distribution of payoffs. Clearly the proposing country prefers to be non-pivotal as pivotal countries" payoffs are reduced to benchmark payoffs. If a country i is selected as proposer, it will try to set an MPR that stabilises the grand coalition such that i is non-pivotal while countries ji are pivotal. This minimises others" outside option payoff subject to i being non-pivotal. This implies that it could be optimal for the proposing country i to propose Nirather than N. Clearly if i is close to N most countries will be non-pivotal, the sum of outside option payoffs is larger and this strategy will eventually undermine the internal stability of N . Still in this case it may be optimal to propose Ni, provided that this proposal would be acceptable. To fix ideas, we first examine the "smallest" country, country 1.
RESULT For a randomly selected proposer we have the following result. 
RESULT 12 If country i is the proposer, it proposes

Policy coordination and IEAs
As IEAs are wide-spread and important for environmental policy making we turn now to discuss the significance of our theoretical results for environmental policy coordination. Also we provide a more in-depth review of previous contributions on MPRs in the literature. Even though, as we show, MPRs may have a decisive role for the stability of IEAs, only a few previous theoretical contributions exist in the literature with an explicit focus on MPRs. Closest to our research are models with perfect information. To these we turn first. Then we broaden the scope and discuss MPRs under uncertainty and incomplete information about payoff structures. Rutz (2001) analyses the role of MPRs in the coalition formation game that has become canonical for the study of IEAs (Hoel 1992 , Carraro and Siniscalco 1993 , Barrett 1994 . In this game a coalition forms at stage 1 and, at stage 2, the coalition and the non-signatories play the transboundary pollution game. Rutz considers identical countries and shows that the equilibrium number of signatories is equal to a number required by an exogenously given MPR. Rubio and Casino (2005) introduce a stock pollutant into the game. The partition function is generated by a differential game. They consider the effect of MPRs and arrive at the same conclusion: once an MPR is established, the size of a stable coalition is the number of countries required by the MPR. In these studies the MPR is exogenous. Carraro et al. (2009) have extended the model to analyse the endogenous choice of an MPR. The MPR is unanimously agreed in the first stage of the game. Once the MPR is established, the standard IEA formation game follows. Carraro et al. (2009) arrive at the result that there exists (among other equilibria) an equilibrium MPR that requires full participation such that the grand coalition is stable.
Our model is an extension of Carraro et al. (2009) . While the basic set-up of our game is similar, we allow for heterogeneous players. This is an important step towards practical applicability of the theoretical analysis of MPRs. Introducing heterogeneous players poses three challenges for the analysis. First, if players differ with respect to benefits and costs of abatement, the design of transfer schemes (e.g. tradable permits) is an important determinant of the stability of coalitions. The benefits from cooperation can be shared in different ways. A sharing rule (or transfer scheme) that satisfies the Claim Rights Condition will support stability whenever it is feasible. Second, with heterogeneous players, the equilibria of the game cannot be described by the number of players anymore. The identity of players matters. Third, the different characteristics of players allow for the use of different types of MPRs. An MPR may require a minimum number of countries, but it may also require some other aggregate characteristics. In our analysis we choose for the equilibrium abatement level of countries in the noncooperative equilibrium of the transboundary pollution game. This captures the "size" of the different countries. Addressing these three challenges together is a genuine novelty in the analysis of MPRs.
We now turn to a more detailed discussion of our results and link them to international environmental policy making.
First notice that, due to superadditivity, an increase in coalition size will always increase the gains from cooperation. With a sufficiently strict MPR it is more likely to stabilise larger coalitions than in the absence of an MPR (RESULT 9). An immediate implication is that a social planner would set an MPR sufficiently strict to stabilise the grand coalition. Hence, the result derived by Rutz (2001) generalises to heterogeneous countries. Comparing our findings to the results obtained by Carraro et al. (2009) we notice a difference. We find, in contrast to the result of Carraro et al. (2009) , that the equilibrium MPR is generally not requiring full participation. The equilibrium proposal will allow the proposing country to free-ride on the coalition consisting of all other countries. Still the grand coalition will emerge if the country that proposes the MPR is sufficiently small as compared to other countries. With identical countries a grand coalition emerges in an equilibrium, as found by Carraro et al. (2009) .
Our model underlines the importance of agenda-setting. We model the first stage of the game as a simple bargaining game with a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The country that can make a proposal, or sets the agenda, is able to exploit some bargaining power. Country i"s equilibrium proposal ( Ni) makes i nonpivotal for the grand coalition. This establishes a larger claim and, hence, a larger payoff under any sharing rule that satisfies the Claim Rights Condition.
One interesting implication of our model is that if free-riding occurs in equilibrium, it will be a large country that free-rides. The equilibrium proposal of a large country ( Ni) makes all smaller countries non-pivotal and increases their claims such that condition (3) is not met for the grand coalition.
The implication of this finding for environmental policy making is that large countries" power to the set the agenda is more likely to lead to inefficient results compared to small countries.
To summarise our results, we find that MPRs can play a significant role to establish successful coalitions that overcome the free-rider problem in the provision of public goods. In many cases an efficient grand coalition emerges. In some cases a single large player free-rides. Still in a setting with many players the largest part of the gains from cooperation can be reaped.
These optimistic results must be interpreted with care. Our model is a game with complete information, i.e. each player is informed about choice options (strategy spaces) and payoffs of all other players. However, the long-term environmental impacts that an IEA addresses and the technological abatement options are generally uncertain. This leads to uncertain payoffs -an issue that hampers, presumably, the formation of a global climate agreement. In addition coalition formation is a political process and there may be uncertainties about policy preferences as well. Black et al. (1993) were the first to provide an analysis of the role of MPRs for IEAs under uncertainty. They include incomplete information in their model assuming that individual countries know their cost function but do not know their benefits from the agreement. Black et al. (1993) use this approach in order to assess the optimality of MPRs depending on different abatement costs as well as the number of participating countries. Countries are assumed to be symmetric and the binary choice about coalition formation is made simultaneously, or at least without knowledge about the decision of the other countries (Black et al. 1993, p. 284) . Therefore, countries are uncertain about whether a coalition will be formed or not. According to the underlying assumptions of the model, coalition formation is only possible under the condition that an MPR is incorporated into the treaty. The motivation to sign an agreement "is the contribution that added commitment makes to the likelihood that the treaty is effected" (Black et al. 1993, footnote 9) .
Under incomplete information about the payoffs the grand coalition might not be efficient (individual marginal abatement costs may exceed the sum of expected marginal benefits). Therefore, in contrast to our model, a social planer would eventually choose a threshold below the grand coalition.
Harstad (2006) 
Conclusions
In this paper we show that the model of endogenous choice of minimum participation rules (MPRs) for international environmental agreements Furthermore, signing -and ratifying-an agreement just means that countries declare their intention to contribute to the public good. It is an additional step to incorporate the treaty into national law. Clearly, the important issue here is enforcement. Barrett (2009) 
